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Abstract. The corporate responsibility report demonstrates an organisation‟s commitment 
to sustainability. Currently, not much is known about the quality of the assurance 
statements of the corporate responsibility reports of banks in Australia. This research study 
fills the gap in the literature by investigating the corporate responsibility report assurance 
statements of the Big Four banks in Australia. The assurance statements are evaluated 
against the criteria provided by O‟Dwyer and Owen (2005) and Perego and Kolk (2012). 
The results reveal that although the assurance statements, on average, meet the criteria 
highly, there are areas that need improvement. 
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1. Introduction 
orporate responsibility (sustainability) reporting, that is, the reporting of an 
organisation‟s economic, environmental, and social performance (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2006), is becoming widespread. According to the 
KPMG (2011) international survey of corporate responsibility reporting, 95 per 
cent of the top 250 companies listed on the Fortune Global 500 (G250) prepared 
corporate responsibility reports compared with around 80 per cent in the 2008 
survey. Similarly, for the 100 largest companies by revenue from 34 countries 
(N100), the number of reporting companies increased from 53 per cent to 64 per 
cent. The top drivers for corporate responsibility reporting were reputation or 
brand, ethical considerations, employee motivation, and innovation and learning.  
In Australia, the KPMG (2011) international survey of corporate responsibility 
reporting found that the percentage of the largest 100 companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) that reported on their corporate responsibility 
initiatives increased from 45 per cent in 2008 to 57 per cent in 2011. The key 
drivers for reporting were the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007, the development of the Department of Climate Change‟s Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS), and the ASX‟s revised Principle 7, which considers 
sustainability issues as a material business risk. Higgins et al (forthcoming) 
identified 126 Australian companies that have produced stand-alone corporate 
responsibility reports, out of which 70% were classified as high impact companies 
(e.g. mining, pulp/paper, utilities, gas and oil) and 65% of the reporting companies 
were classified as high social public visibility (e.g. banks, financial services, 
communications, media and computing). 
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There is also an increasing trend of corporate responsibility assurance, which is 
voluntary to companies through external and independent assurance providers to 
establish credibility and reliability of corporate responsibility reporting (Ball, 
Owen & Gray, 2000; Edgley, Jones & Solomon, 2010). In Australia, 51 per cent of 
the largest 100 ASX-listed companies conducted assurance activities on their 
corporate responsibility reports in the KPMG (2011) survey, compared to 42 per 
cent in the last survey. The main drivers for companies to seek assurance of their 
corporate responsibility reports are: enhancement of the credibility of their reports 
and improvement in the quality of reported information. Although the trend is 
rising, there are many companies that still do not have their corporate responsibility 
reports assured. As KPMG (2011: 28) state: 
“It is surprising, therefore, that only 46 per cent of the G250 and 38 
per cent of N100 companies currently use assurance as a strategy to 
verify and assess their CR data. And while this is slightly higher than 
the 2008 figures, it is also a troubling finding; companies without an 
external assurance program not only run the risk of restatements in the 
future, but also send the message that CR information is not held in as 
high regard as financial information, which is frequently assured in 
most businesses.” 
In relation to the assurance providers, the major accounting firms performed 71 
per cent of the G250 assurance engagements and 64 per cent of the N100. With 
respect to the assurance standards used, there are two standards that are commonly 
used: International Federation of Accountants‟ International Standard on Assurance 
Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (ASAE3000 in Australia) Assurance Engagements 
Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information and 
AccountAbility‟s (a non-profit organisation) AA1000 Assurance Standard 2008. 
The two assurance standards are compatible. According to AccountAbility‟s 
website (2013): 
“AA1000AS (2008) is compatible with the methodology of 
ISAE3000…(it) is unique as it requires the assurance provider to 
evaluate the extent of adherence to a set of principles rather than 
simply assessing the reliability of the data. The AA1000AS (2008) 
requires the assurance provider to look at underlying management 
approaches, systems and processes and how stakeholders have 
participated. Using the AA1000AS, the assurance provider evaluates 
the nature and extent to which an organisation adheres to the 
AccountAbility Principles in the AA1000 APS (2008).” 
In the KPMG (2008) survey, 62 per cent of the G250 companies and 54 per cent 
of the N100 companies used the ISAE3000 assurance standard. For accounting 
firms, it is obligatory to use the ISAE3000 assurance standard if there is no 
national alternative. 
Currently, not much is known about the quality of the assurance statements of 
the corporate responsibility reports of banks in Australia. This research study fills 
the gap in the literature by investigating the corporate responsibility report 
assurance statements of the Big Four banks in Australia. The assurance statements 
are evaluated against the criteria provided by O‟Dwyer & Owen (2005) and Perego 
and Kolk (2012). The results reveal that although the assurance statements, on 
average, meet the criteria highly, there are areas that need improvement. 
 
2. Literature review 
Corporate responsibility reporting has significantly increased in the past twenty 
years resulted from growing public and national concerns over social and 
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environmental issues (Gray, 2000; O‟Dwyer & Owen, 2005). In 2001, France 
became the first country in the world that required corporate social responsibility 
reports from listed companies. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
followed with mandatory requirements. Some of the corporations are attracted to 
the idea of corporate responsibility reporting as a means to attract capital from 
socially responsible investors (Tschopp & Nastanski, 2014).  
While there is an increase in the uptake of assurance of corporate responsibility 
reports (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008; Junior, Best & Cotter, 2014), it is not certain 
whether there is a corresponding increase in the quality of the assurance statements 
that accompany the corporate responsibility reports [see, for example, Milne et al 
(2009), Milne & Gray (2013) and Morhardt (2010)]. For one, it isnot uncommon 
for organisations to disclose information on social and environmental issues that 
areless extensive and of lower quality as compared to financial information (Gray 
& Milne, 2002). In their study of the Canadian experience in sustainability 
reporting, Nitkin & Brooks (1998) noted that the quality of the reports varied 
significantly among the Canadian firms. There was little standardisation of the 
reports‟ format, and the main catalyst to engage in sustainability reporting and 
auditing came largely from ISO and European developments. Criado-Jimenez et al 
(2008) investigated the reporting patterns of 78 large Spanish companies between 
2001 and 2003. The study found that companies engaged in concealment strategies 
therebymisleading the investors and stakeholders. The concealment was supported 
by the fact that companies had engaged in biased disclosure by revealing more 
news and information that would put the companies in a more positive light.  
Deegan et. al. (2006) investigated the assurance statements that accompanied 
the corporate responsibility reports of 170 companies in the United Kingdom and 
Europe. The study shows that there are several areas of concern that need 
improvement. These include the following: (1) It is uncommon for assurance 
statements to indicate the party that is responsible for the preparation of the 
corporate responsibility reports and the party that is responsible for the preparation 
of the assurance statements; (2) There are issues related to the perceived 
independence of assurance providers; (3) There is a wide variation in the titles of 
assurance statements; (4) There is also a wide variation in the addressees of the 
assurance statements; (5) Assurance providers provide limited information on the 
objectives and scope of their assurance engagement and the work performed; (6) 
The majority of the assurance statements do not indicate whether the corporate 
responsibility report is assessed against a reporting criteria; (7) Most of the 
assurance statements also do not indicate the standards used to govern the work 
performed; and (8) There is a wide variation in the wording used in the conclusion 
and many of the terms used have no clear meaning. 
It is well known that the goal of an organisation is to maximise the 
shareholders‟ value. To meet the goal, the Board of Directors have to understand 
the impact of the company‟s actions on the social environment. There is an 
expectation from the society that the company must use the resources in the 
manner that the benefits to the society derived from the usage would exceed the 
cost. In this regard, companies with a good standard of corporate governance 
should demonstrate greater responsibility toward the society and the environment 
as compared with a company with poorer corporate governance. To test the 
hypothesis, Chan et al (2014) assessed the relationship between corporate 
governance quality (based on the companies‟ performance in corporate governance 
areas such as Board of Directors, auditor independence and board committees) and 
the amount of CSR information disclosed by the top 300 companies traded on the 
Australian stock exchange. The authors concluded that corporate governance 
quality is positively associated with CSR activities and disclosure. In another 
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study, Mohammad Issam Jizi et al (2014) used a sample of large US commercial 
banks for the period 2009-2011, and concluded that the a higher standard of 
corporate governance (such as larger boards and more independent directors) is 
positively associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Research on corporate responsibility reporting in Australia is limited despite of 
its considerable long history of reporting especially in the high impact industries in 
oil and mineral excavation. One recent paper that has discussed corporate 
responsibility reporting in Australia attempts to find out why Australian firms have 
produced stand-alone reporting and the benefits that the firms would expect to 
receive from undertaking sustainability reporting (Higgins et al, forthcoming), 
Based on a sample size of 64 companies that cut across the various industries, the 
authors, via telephone survey, found that responding to pressure from the 
stakeholders appeared to be a major motivating factor for sustainability reporting 
for high impact (e.g. oil and gas) and high visibility (e.g. banks and 
communications) industries. The intention to signal organisational commitment to 
social responsibility or sustainability to improve or manage companies‟ reputation 
is another major catalyst for sustainability reporting, prompting the authors to 
conclude that the Australian companies are „motivated by strategic competitiveness 
and differentiation‟, and that „strategic importance of sustainability reporting‟, at 
least in the Australian context, „is now widely explained as a rationale‟ for 
corporate responsibility reporting. 
With regards to corporate responsibility reporting of banks in Australia, Tiong 
& Anantharaman (2011) examined the corporate responsibility disclosures of three 
big Australian banks (The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, 
National Australia Bank, and Westpac Banking Corporation) which prepared their 
corporate responsibility reports according to the Global Reporting Initiative‟s 
(GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and Financial Services Sector 
Supplement. The results show that although the banks provided a high level of 
disclosure, there were several areas that needed improvement. First, banks need to 
provide the reason for the omission of a performance indicator. Second, banks 
should clearly indicate which part(s) of a discussion relate specifically to the 
performance indicator. Third, banks should also indicate whether a performance 
indicator has been fully reported, partially or not reported. 
This research study builds on extant literature by investigating the corporate 
responsibility report assurance statements of the Big Four banks in Australia; 
namely, The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), The 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB), and 
Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC). The findings of this study will contribute to 
our understanding of the quality of assurance statements that accompany the banks‟ 
responsibility reports and to identify areas for improvement. 
 
3. Research methodology 
The investigation of the assurance statements of the Big Four banks in Australia 
- ANZ, CBA, NAB, and WBC - commenced by downloading the latest statements 
(financial year 2013) from the banks‟ websites. The quality of the assurance 
statements is evaluated against the framework provided by O‟Dwyer & Owen 
(2005), who developed the minimum requirements of a high quality assurance 
statement that enhances the credibility, stakeholder responsiveness, and 
comparability of corporate responsibility reports with particular reference to the 
assurance standards requirements of AccountAbility (2003a, b), Fédération des 
Experts Comptables Européens (FEE) (2002), and GRI (2002). The evaluative 
framework comprises 19 ranking criteria (see Appendix 1). A score of 0, 1, or 2 is 
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awardedaccording to the definition of each ranking criterion provided by Perego & 
Kolk (2012) who used the evaluative framework developed by O‟Dwyer & Owen 
(2005) to study the evolution of assurance statements that accompany the corporate 
responsibility reports of multinational companies. The banks‟ assurance statements 
were evaluated andthe scores awarded by the researchers together. The range of 
scores is from zero (lowest quality) to 27 (highest quality).  
 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 1 shows 2014 full year financial results of the Big Four banks. Overall, 
the banks generated healthy financial results with CBA leading the pack with a net 
profit of A$8.6 billion. WBC earned a net profit of A$7.6 billion whereas ANZ and 
NAB earned A$7.3 billion and A$5.3 billion in net profit in 2014, respectively. 
The annual dividends pay-out differs quite substantially with CBA paying a 
dividend of A$2.18 cents per share. This was followed closely by NAB at A$1.98 
per share. WBC and ANZ‟s annual dividends pay-out were A$1.82 per share and 
A$0.95 per share, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Financial performance 2014 
 Net profit 
(A$ bil) 
Return on 
equity (%) 
Dividends 
per share (A$) 
Common 
equity tier 1 
ratio 
ANZ 7.3 (15%) 15.4 0.95 8.79 
CBA 8.6 (13%) 18.7 2.18 9.30 
NAB 5.3 (-1.1%) 11.8 1.98 8.63 
WBC 7.6 (12%) 16.4 1.82 9.00 
Figures in parentheses represent the percentage change over the previous year (i.e. 2013) 
Source: Extracted from 
http://www.shareholder.anz.com/sites/default/files/event_files/ANZ%20FY14%20Results%20Media
%20Release%20301014-FINAL.pdf (ANZ) https://www.commbank.com.au/about-
us/shareholders/financial-information/results.html (CBA); http://www.nab.com.au/about-
us/shareholder-centre/financial-disclosuresandreporting/financial-results (NAB);  
http://www.westpac.com.au/about-westpac/investor-centre/presentations-webcasts/2014/2014-full-
year-results/ (WBC) (accessed: 26 November 2014) 
 
Table 2 shows the average change in the share price of the four banks and the 
Dow Jones Suitability Index (DJSI) using monthly data from February 2009 to 
February 2014. Established in 1999 to track the stock performance of leading 
sustainability companies, DJSI serves as a benchmark in sustainability investing 
and to assess the performance of companies that have been touted as sustainable. 
The data shows that the four Australian banks have outperformed the DJSI during 
the period of studywith the average change in the share price ranging from 1.3 per 
cent to 1.7 per cent as compared to 0.9 per cent for DJSI. The correlation 
coefficients between the banks share price movement and that of DJSI confirm the 
strong association between the variables, suggesting that the share price movement 
of the four banks has not deviated significantly from the group of sustainable 
companies as defined by Dow Jones. It is worth noting, however, that the 
correlation coefficients do not merely consider whether corporate responsibility 
reporting has led to close association between the average change in the 
companies‟ share price and that of DJSI Australia. The correlation could have been 
realized because of some variables other than corporate responsibility reporting. 
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Table 2: Average changes in the share price and correlation coefficients 
(February 2009 – February 2014) 
Period ANZ CBA NAB WBC DJSI Aus* 
Average change in 
the share price 
(02/2009-02/2014) 
1.7% 
(0.8092) 
1.7% 
(0.9231) 
1.3% 
(0.4409) 
1.4% 
(0.4840) 
0.9% 
 
Variance 6.69% 5.38% 6.48% 6.83% 4.04% 
Sample size 61 61 61 61 61 
Correlation coefficients 
ANZ-DJSI 0.8441** 
CBA-DJSI 0.7346** 
NAB-DJSI 0.8106** 
WBC-DJSI 0.8291** 
*Dow Jones Sustainability Index Australia 
**Significant at 1% level 
Figures in parentheses represent the t value to test for difference between two means. The 
mean differences are statistically insignificant at 1% level. 
 
Three of the banks‟ corporate responsibility reports were assured by big four 
accounting firms: CBA by KPMG, Sydney; NAB by Ernst & Young, Melbourne; 
WBC also by KPMG, Sydney. ANZ‟s report was assured by a non-accounting 
firm: Corporate Citizenship, London.  
The quality of the banks‟ corporate responsibility reports was assessed using the 
O‟Dwyer and Owen (2005) framework. The four banks achieved an average score 
of 22 out of a maximum of 27; that is, 81%. ANZ obtained a score of 24 (89%), 
CBA 18 (67%), NAB 21 (78%), and WBC 24 (89%). It is interesting to observe 
that CBA and WBC – which were both assured by KPMG, Sydney – had different 
scores. The difference in the scores could be due to the assurance exercise being 
conducted at the two banks by different teams and there was not a standard 
assurance statementthat was used by the auditors. 
All the assurance statements scored fully for the following ranking criteria: title, 
name of assuror, location of assuror, report date, responsibilities of reporter, 
responsibilities of assuror, independence of assuror from reporting organization, 
scope of the assurance engagement, criteria used to assess evidence and reach 
conclusion, assurance standard used, summary of work performed, and 
completeness. This is commendable. 
The results show that there are several areas that need improvement: 
 Addressee: The assuror of ANZ, CBA, and WBC need to mention the 
stakeholder to whom the assurance statement is formally addressed, either in the 
title, separate addressee line, or within the text. 
 Impartiality of assuror towards stakeholders: All the assurors need to 
providean assuror‟s declaration of impartiality with respect to stakeholder interests. 
 Objective of the assurance engagement: The level of assurance could be 
increased to reasonable assurance for all four banks. 
 Competencies of assuror: The assuror of CBA did not describe the 
professional skills that enable them to conduct the assurance exercise. Although the 
assuror of NAB made a statement claiming competency, there was no explanatory 
note of their competencies based on prior experience/engagements. 
 Materiality (from a stakeholder perspective): The assuror of CBA only 
provided a broad statement on the materiality level using the words “…in all 
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material respects…”.The assuror of NAB, however, explained the materiality 
setting; but, the stakeholder perspective was not introduced. 
 Responsiveness to stakeholders: The assuror of CBA and NAB need to 
provide a statement referring to the bank‟s procedures (or lack of them) for 
identifying stakeholder interests and concerns. 
 General conclusion/opinion: The assuror of CBA and NAB need to provide 
a more detailed explanatory statement to express the result and conclusion of the 
assurance exercise. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This research study investigates the corporate responsibility report assurance 
statements of the Big Four banks in Australia. The results show that the average 
score of the assurance statements is 22 out of a maximum of 27 or 81%. To achieve 
the maximum score, the following areas of the assurance statements need to be 
improved: addressee, impartiality of assuror towards stakeholder, objective of the 
assurance engagement, competencies of assuror, materiality (from a stakeholder 
perspective), responsiveness to stakeholders, and general conclusion/opinion. 
Future research studies could investigate the corporate responsibility report 
assurance statements in other financial services sub-sectors such as securities and 
finance sub-sectors to gain insights of the quality of assurance statements in these 
sub-sectors and to identify areas that need improvement.  
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APPENDIX 1: Coding rules for the content analysis 
Ranking criteria Definition Scale ANZ CBA NAB WB
C 
Assuror - - Corpor
ate 
Citizen
ship, 
London 
KP
MG, 
Sydn
ey 
Ernst 
& 
Young, 
Melbo
urne 
KP
MG, 
Sydn
ey 
Date of 
assurance report 
- - 30 Apr  
2013 
4 
Oct 
2013 
1 Nov  
2012 
6 
Nov 
2012 
1. Title Title of the assurance 
statement 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
2. Addres
see 
Party to whom the 
assurance statement is 
formally addressed 
(either in title separate 
addressee line or 
within text) 
0 No reference 
1 Address is 
internal or “the 
readers” 
2 Stakeholder 
mentioned in 
the addressee 
1 1 2 1 
3. Name 
of assuror 
Name of the firm that 
conducts the assurance 
engagement 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
4. Locatio
n of assuror 
Location of the office 
of the assurance 
provider 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
5. Report 
date 
Reference to the date at 
which the assurance 
exercise was finished 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
6. Respon
sibilities of 
reporter 
Explicit statement that 
reporter is responsible 
for preparation of 
report (keywords: 
responsible, 
responsibility) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
7. Respon
sibilities of 
assuror 
Explicit statement that 
the reporter is 
responsible to express 
an (independent) 
opinion on the subject 
matter (the 
sustainability/environm
ental/social report) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
8. Indepe
ndence of 
assuror from 
reporting 
organization 
Statement expressing 
the independence of 
the two parties 
involved (a 1 is 
assigned as soon as the 
word(s) independent or 
independence appear 
anywhere in the 
assurance statement or 
its title. Thus, remarks 
such as “this is an 
independent 
opinion…” already 
qualifies for a 1) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference or 
mere statement 
expressing that 
independence 
can be looked 
up on the 
internet 
1 1 1 1 
9. Imparti
ality of assuror 
towards 
stakeholders 
Assuror‟s declaration 
of impartiality with 
respect to stakeholder 
interests 
0 No reference 
1 Reference (a 
remark that such 
a declaration 
can be made 
available on 
0 0 0 0 
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request or 
reference to an 
internet site 
already qualifies 
for a 1) 
10. Scope 
of the assurance 
engagement 
Assurance statement 
coverage (a 1 is 
assigned if anywhere in 
the assurance statement 
the coverage of the 
assurance exercise is 
stated) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
11. Objecti
ve of the 
assurance 
engagement 
Objective to be 
achieved through the 
engagement (indicating 
the level of assurance 
intended) 
0 No reference 
1 Review, 
limited 
assurance, 
independent 
opinion, 
independent 
assurance, 
external 
verification, 
external 
assurance or 
validation 
2 Reasonable 
assurance, or 
reasonable and 
limited 
assurance (e.g., 
two different 
levels of 
assurance for 
different parts 
of the report) 
1 1 1 1 
12. Compe
tencies of assuror 
Description of the 
professional skills that 
enable the engagement 
team to conduct the 
assurance exercise 
0 No reference 
1 Statement 
claiming 
competency 
(but no 
explanatory 
note) or mere 
reference to an 
internet site 
2 Explanatory 
statement of 
competencies 
based on prior 
experience/enga
gements 
2 0 1 2 
13. Criteria 
used to assess 
evidence and 
reach conclusion 
A statement that makes 
reference to particular 
criteria against which 
the sustainability report 
has been prepared (e.g. 
GRI and often 
internally developed 
standards) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference to 
publicly 
unavailable 
criteria 
2 Reference to 
publicly 
available 
criteria (e.g., 
internally 
developed 
criteria that are 
published 
anywhere in the 
2 2 2 2 
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report or GRI) 
14. Assura
nce standard 
used 
Standards used which 
govern the work of the 
assurance provider 
(e.g. AA1000AS or 
ISAE3000) 
0 No reference 
1 Reference to 
publicly 
unavailable 
criteria 
2 Reference to 
publicly 
available 
criteria 
2 2 2 2 
15. Summa
ry of work 
performed 
Statement explaining 
the actions taken to 
arrive at a conclusion 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
16. Materi
ality (from a 
stakeholder 
perspective) 
Degree of information 
provision on 
materiality level. If the 
conclusion states that 
the report is in 
conformance with the 
AA1000 principles 
(Materiality, 
completeness, and 
responsiveness) this 
qualifies for a 
reference and thus a 1 
is assigned 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
limited to a 
broad statement 
(e.g. “covers all 
material 
aspects” or 
“…in all 
material 
respects…”) but 
also negative 
statements 
claiming that 
assuror has not 
undertaken any 
work to confirm 
that all 
relevant/materia
l issues are 
included 
2 Reference and 
explanation of 
materiality 
setting or 
reference 
limited to a 
broad statement 
and stakeholder 
perspective 
introduced (e.g. 
“issues material 
to stakeholders 
have been 
considered”) 
3 Reference, 
explanation of 
materiality 
setting and 
stakeholder 
perspective 
introduced 
3 1 2 3 
17. Compl
eteness 
Statement expressing 
that all material aspects 
are covered by the 
report. If the 
conclusion states that 
the report is in 
conformance with the 
AA1000 principles 
(Materiality, 
completeness, and 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 1 1 1 
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responsiveness) this 
qualifies for a 
reference and thus a 1 
is assigned 
18. Respon
siveness to 
stakeholders 
Statement referring to 
the organization‟s 
procedures (or lack of 
them) for identifying 
stakeholder interests 
and concerns. If the 
conclusion states that 
the report is in 
conformance with the 
AA1000 principles 
(Materiality, 
completeness, and 
responsiveness) this 
qualifies for a 
reference and thus a 1 
is assigned 
0 No reference 
1 Reference 
1 0 0 1 
19. Genera
l 
conclusion/opini
on 
Statement expressing 
the result of the 
assurance exercise. If 
there is no general 
conclusion but the 
conclusion solely refers 
to the 3 principles of 
AA1000 (Materiality, 
completeness, and 
responsiveness) a 0 is 
assigned 
0 No reference 
1 Mere 
statement 
expressing the 
opinion of the 
assuror (e.g., 
“XY‟s report is 
a fair 
presentation of 
XY‟s CSR 
performance”). 
A 1 is assigned 
only if the 
conclusion 
consists only of 
one sentence 
2 Explanatory 
statement (more 
than one 
sentence, but 
recommendatio
ns for 
improvement 
are not 
considered part 
of the 
conclusion) 
2 1 1 2 
Total Maximum score = 27 
(100%) 
- 24 
(89%) 
18 
(67
%) 
21  
(78%) 
24 
(89
%) 
Mean - - 22 (81%) 
Source: Adapted from Perego and Kolk (2012) 
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